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Edward Allen Beach. The Potengies of God(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1994. Pp xii + 317 . Board, $18.95.
An interesting theme of this book is the necessary ambivalence of human consciousness
toward the object of religion. Parallel to this psychological ambivalence, objective ambiguities turn up in the history of religions: whether religion's object is one or plural,
natural or spiritual, a completed entity or a developing one. Schelling devoted the last
half of his life (in the lecture hall if not in print) to a two-sided attempt to revive theistic
metaphysics and to "demonstrate" the reality of God in the history of religions. Beach's
tide, with its ambiguity about the number of deity, reflects Schelling's bold attempt to
validate the sky-monism of hunter-gatherers and the polytheism of early agricultural
peoples as genuine religious experience. He made them phases of the development of
true, revealed (i.e., Christian) religion by making their objects necessary components
(or potencies) of the divine essence, displayed in mock independence in the history of
mythology, but once properly developed and subordinated, the support for the experiential revelation of the actual, personal God.
Schelling's p r o g r a m m e in the late or Positive Philosophy is complicated both by its
subject and its presentation in discrete lecture courses. Other scholars have treated the
complexity of Schelling's attitude toward philosophy after the 182os, his repudiation
of the static conceptualism of his own Identity-Philosophy and of Hegel's system as
merely "negative" philosophy, and his demand that will, decision (freedom) and actuality be taken as the supports and starting-points of a second or "positive" philosophy.
T h e classic study here is Walter Schulz's Die VoUendung des Deutschen ldealismus in der
Spiitphilosophie ScheUings (end ed., Pftitlingen: Neske, 1975). Beach focusses instead on
the complexity of the vehicle Schelling chose to convey this positive philosophy: the
history of religions, or in Scheiling's terms the philosophies of mythology and revelation. T h o u g h Schelling turned to theistic metaphysics late in life, he always regarded
myth and symbol as the point where aesthetics, metaphysics, and religion converged.
He developed an eye for the nuanced phenomena of religious experience, resisting the
tendency of the nineteenth-century academy to reduce religious representations either
to a flat mirroring of historical events or to an externalization of internal psychic
conflicts. Beach shows how Schelling incorporated the historical and especially the
psychological dimensions of religious experience into a nonreductive account of the
unfolding of the divine reality in human cultures, inside a history generated not
accidentally by the mere accumulation of unrelated events, but one driven by the logic
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of the unfolding of the divine essence. The genius of Schelling's view of religion is to
argue that "screens" placed by linguistic, cultural, and temporal differences do not
divide the worshipper/intuiter from the "true God" but are preparatory vehicles necessary for the lived encounter with God.
Comparing Schelling's method to the "hermeneutics of suspicion" practiced by
Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Freud which resulted in purely reductive theories---e.g.,
Feuerbach's thesis that the gods are simultaneous projections of human capacity and
incapacity--Beach argues that Schelling's theory offers a "sublimated projection
theory" of religion. Rooted in the conviction that human consciousness is "Godpositing" but confronted with the facts that there are inconsistent paradigms of religion and its object(s), this theory first works deconstructively upon these ambiguities,
then opens itself up for an "ecstatic," intuitive or experiential moment of spiritual
illumination, but finally returns to rational discourse for a moment of "theodicy" or
"confirmation." Beach abstracts this picture from Schelling's actual speculation, which
is more technical and often pedantic, but all three elements are Schelling's novel
contributions: (1) ambiguity--acceptance and rejection, fear and love--is central to
religious experience and to the situation of the human vis-a-vis the divine; (2) the
absolute is only in intellectual intuition; God is touched only in ec-stasy, i.e., departure
from reason; (3) there can nonetheless be a historical-critical philosophical reconstruction of the revelatory event. Beach is evidently convinced these elements are necessary,
if not sufficient, conditions of an authentic faith.
Beach grounds his argument in solid textual scholarship. He lucidly presents the
background o f nineteenth-century views on religion, and tellingly argues for Schelling's significance. Most importantly, he always conducts his discussion philosophically,
with a critical eye for what is true (or plausible, or salvageable) in Schelling's theory.
Since he takes the empirical criterion of verifiability as the touchstone of truth, he must
reject much o f Schelling's speculation as lacking logical ground. But since Beach tends
to accept the irrational, the unconscious, and the volitional as positive features whose
home is religion, his heart is often ready to accept teachings from Schelling which his
head has decreed undecidable.
T h e book's flaw is that it presents Schelling's late, unpublished philosophy as his
whole philosophy. Beach turns the shortcoming into a virtue, for a Schelling who
always and only champions the volitional, the unconscious, and the irrational seems to
present a clear alternative to Hegel's monolithic conceptualism. This makes for a tidy
story, but it ignores the fact that Schelling invented idealistic conceptualism along with
Hegel when they worked on the Critical Journal. Schelling had reason and unreason,
the conscious and the unconscious, intertwined from the start. His later moves against
conceptual idealism are in the main a preference for actuality over possibility, for
existence over essence. Beach is right to see willing or need, the dynamic of the
ground, as central to Schelling's later thought, and also the free choice of reason over
unreason as the logic of the process of creation. But for Schelling these processes result
in a world in which reason has secure purchase, even if it is derived from a superrational actuality. T h o u g h Schopenhauer was troubled by Schelling's anticipations
of his voluntarism, no one confused the two.
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Lucid and argumentative as this book is, it is somewhat premature. None o f the
texts Beach works u p o n are yet available in translation. This book may in time secure
them a welcome.
MICHAEL G. VATER

Marquette University

J o h n Richardson. Nietzsche's System. New York: O x f o r d University Press, 1996. Pp. xii
+ 316. Cloth, $35.oo.
J o h n Richardson's Nietzsche is very different indeed from the various French Nietzsches and their Anglo-American cousins who were all the rage not so very long ago.
His Nietzsche is closer in some ways to their analytical rivals, and in others (as his title
invites one to surmise) to their more historically-attuned and systematically-minded
p r e d e c e s s o r s - - H e i d e g g e r a m o n g them. He concludes his book with the assertion that
Nietzsche "remains deeply continuous with the tradition before him," making much o f
his affinities as well as his disagreements with Plato (yes, Plato!) and Aristotle in particular. Richardson makes a major contribution to the a r g u m e n t that "Nietzsche retains the
'cognitive' values o f philosophy's tradition---only reinterpreting them, not rejecting
them" (290) . T h a t makes the book both refreshing and well worth reading, not only by
those interested in Nietzsche but also by anyone interested in the possibility and prospects o f a post-traditional approach to truth and knowledge.
T h e r e is much else that is surprising about Richardson's b o o k - - s o m e o f it welcome, and some o f it worrisome. He nicely takes it for granted that Nietzsche is a
philosopher o f major importance, to be taken seriously and dealt with as such. T h e r e
also is much to be said for his conviction that Nietzsche's thinking on a good many
matters developed in the direction o f coherence. It is a stretch, however, to proclaim
that it amounts to a " s y s t e m " - - a n d one which features a "metaphysics" at that. T h a t
overstates the case needlessly, and creates an artificial issue that is all too likely to
distract attention from the real substance o f Richardson's interpretation.
Further: even if one countenances the use o f Nietzsche's unpublished Nachlass as
well as his published writings early and late (as I do), one would expect at least a little
m o r e sensitivity at this late date than Richardson shows to the questions this sometimes
raises. But that is less troubling than his deceptively authoritative m a n n e r o f presentation. All too often he sets out an account o f what is p u r p o r t e d to be Nietzsche's position
on some topic as though he were just giving the news, without giving any indication
that there is anything problematic about i t - - a s there often is. Indeed, some o f Richardson's accounts are not only greatly oversimplified but highly questionable at best. For
example, he asserts that for Nietzsche there are "three basic types of p e r s o n s " - namely, "master, slave, and overman" (52). This truncated list would d o Procrustes
proud. O n e who does not already know better will come away with a very impoverished
picture o f Nietzsche's rich inventory o f h u m a n possibilities. As if to make up for its
shortness, Richardson goes on at considerable length about each "type," ascribing all
sorts o f traits to them that go well beyond what Nietzsche actually says about them. O n e

